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MAR 27 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : CIA Awareness of Pre-Hungarian Revolution  
DevelopmentsREFERENCE : Memorandum from the Legislative Counsel to  
DCI dated 22 March 1957

1. The attached Chronology (2 March - 23 October 1956) has been prepared in response to your oral request of 20 March 1957.

2. You will recall that at that morning's Staff Meeting you discussed the likelihood of Congressional questions about our advance intelligence on the Hungarian rebellion and asked that pertinent papers be assembled in a form suitable for ready reference as insurance against such Congressional inquiries or criticism. The attached record of CIA reporting, briefing, and other activity demonstrates our understanding and expression of major developments leading up to the October revolution.

3. All objective chronologies, analyses, and eye-witness accounts of the rebellion testify to its completely spontaneous nature. We now know that the momentum and intensity of the events beginning October 23, 1956 surprised not only Western observers but the Soviets and even the Hungarians themselves. Major General Bela Kiraly has stated that all during September and October "there was not a thought in Hungary that there would be such a sudden outbreak." A report on the revolution prepared in the American Legation in Budapest (State Despatch 392, 21 February 1957) states, "that the struggle was spontaneous, unplanned, and lack of organization was the conclusion of every unprejudiced observer in Budapest." Peter Fryer in his book Hungarian Tragedy observes (as evidence of the spontaneity) that "no one yet has been able to produce a single weapon [used by the Hungarian rebels] manufactured in the West." Eye-witness accounts and information obtained from participants make it clear that the rebels' tactics were improvised on the spot and that leadership did not develop until several days after the outbreak of fighting. Had it not been for certain "accidental" features of the rebellion (23 October), for example, the inflammatory Gero speech and the AVH shooting

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which turned peaceful demonstrations into serious opposition, the Hungarian rebellion might well have taken a less violent turn.

N.B. 4. While our chronological summary does not pretend to show that we predicted the precise time and place of the outbreak of violence in Budapest, it does show that we were aware of and reported on the potential explosiveness of the situation in Hungary and elsewhere in the Satellites. It demonstrates that we had information on the extent and the effect of the liberalization measures undertaken by the Soviets in Hungary, the critical power struggle in the Hungarian Communist hierarchy, the acute dissension in the Party ranks, the deep-rooted hatred of the population for their Communist rulers, and the deteriorating economic conditions. Also, the active part played by writers and other intellectuals in opposing the regime was well-covered. We are on record as pointing out more than once that the Soviets were faced with a choice in Hungary between losing effective control over their Satellite or adopting repressive military measures; in effect, both of these eventualities came to pass.

25X1 5. To give a broader picture of our awareness of the post-20th Party Congress developments, we have included in the Chronology not only raw reports (disseminations) but also OCI articles, notes used by CIA officers in briefing the NSC and other Agencies, PP Guidances, excerpts from your speeches, FBIS interpretations of Communist propaganda, etc. Although not reflected in the summary, it should be recognized that FBIS provided throughout the period very complete coverage of all pertinent broadcasts, both on the teletype and in their daily reports. The documentary material summarized in the attached Chronology is available for more detailed review if needed.

6. The following numbered items, listed in the Chronology, appear to be of particular relevance to Congressional inquiry, although all 91 items contribute to the overall picture:

- 25X1
- No. 13 An early report on the uncontrolled criticism of the Personality Cult and the violent attacks against the Hungarian regime.
  - No. 18 Your remarks at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Dinner about the likelihood of Rakosi's downfall.

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- No. 22 A detailed  report on Hungarian Workers' Party meetings which took place in an atmosphere of "unsurpassed tension and violence."
- No. 41 Our Satellite paper which was discussed with State as early as June. Some of the language of this paper was used in your briefing at the White House in November (see item No. 90).
- No. 63 An OCI article discussing the possibility of a "run-away movement" which could be stopped only by "direct Soviet intervention."
- No. 78 Another OCI article which concludes: "Failure on the part of the USSR to act decisively might lead to a not-too-distant choice between military intervention or a loss of control over some of the Satellites."

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FRANK G. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment: (1)

"Selective Chrono of CIA Intelligence  
Activity Preceding the Hungarian Revolution"  
March - October 1956

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004000170001-1

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SELECTIVE CHRONOLOGY OF CIA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY PRECEDING  
THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

MARCH - OCTOBER 1956

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004000170001-1

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## SELECTIVE CHRONOLOGY OF CIA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY PRECEDING THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE OF DISTRIBUTION OR RELEASE</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION</u>
1.	2 March	Current Intelligence Digest, Page 1	"The possibility of a revision of the Rajk trial, which has been rumored for several months, has been increased by the Soviet party congress' official endorsement of the principle of 'different roads to socialism' and its criticisms of Stalin's practices... It would be an important gesture toward removing an outstanding barrier to closer relations with Yugoslavia."
2.	5 March	25X1	
3.	8 March	Current Intelligence Weekly Review, Page 12	"Hungarian party leader Rakosi, who has been having difficulty for some time in controlling nationalist elements among the Hungarian Communists, probably faces new threats to his position."
4.	18 March	Current Intelligence Bulletin, page 6	"The defensive statements contained in Rakosi's report on the congress tend to support reports of division within the central committee and to indicate that the recent Soviet party congress has strengthened the opposition of nationalist elements within the party."
5.	23 March	Current Intelligence Digest, Page 3	"Since developments at the Soviet party congress are apparently encouraging the strong rightist opposition within the Hungarian party, both Rakosi and Moscow will probably try to pursue a moderate and cautious policy in Hungary in order to avoid further exacerbating the problem of party unity and control."

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6.	30 March	Current Intelligence Bulletin, Page 5	Comment on FBIS report on "rehabilitation" of Laszlo Rajk. "....., the exoneration of Rajk will undoubtedly stimulate the active anti-Rakosi and nationalist sentiment within the Hungarian party."

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE OF DISTRIBUTION OR RELEASE</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION</u>
7.	9 April	25X1 [REDACTED]	"Hungarian Communist Party ranks are in an uproar as a result of the denigration of Stalin. Party members are demanding a national scapegoat, preferably Matyas Rakosi."
8.	10 April	Current Intelligence Digest, Page 5	[REDACTED] 25X1 "These reports, [REDACTED] are 25X1 indicative of the uncertainty within the Hungarian party as a result of the condemnation of Stalin. ...The Hungarian public undoubtedly hopes that the denigration of Stalin will result in removal of the latter's devout 'yes-man' Rakosi."
9.	13 April	DCI address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council	"Stalin's henchmen were put in key positions throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. They hold key places in the European satellite regimes. Each and every one of these appointees must today fear not only for his future, but for his life. "Already political idols are toppling or at least swaying in the wind from Moscow--in Bulgaria, in Hungary, in Poland. Names of former leaders who crossed Stalin are coming back into repute daily, and political circles in the Satellites are plainly in confusion and near panic trying to figure out where the line of propriety will be drawn next."
10.	18 April	Current Intelligence Bulletin, Page 6	"The mounting opposition in the Hungarian party, which will be strengthened by the resignation of Chervenkov in Bulgaria, increases the likelihood that Moscow will withdraw its support of Rakosi."

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11.	20 April	25X1 <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 80px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	<p>"As a consequence of the recent struggle for leadership within the Hungarian Communist Party a new group, which follows a line between the positions of First Secretary Matyas Rakosi and former Premier Imre Nagy, has gained prominence.</p> <p>"Among the principal exponents of this group, which received considerable support after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, are the following persons:</p> <p>"a. Janos Kadar is the Party Secretary for the Budapest area (Pestmegye)."</p>
12.	23 April	Current Intelligence Digest, Page 4	<p>"The Soviet Union has consistently reindorsed Rakosi and appears reluctant to authorize his removal. However, the deterioration of Hungarian party discipline coupled with an apparent intent on the part of the USSR to develop the appearance of greater Satellite autonomy may lead Moscow to re-appraise this support."</p>
13.	25 April	25X1 <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 90px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	<p>An analysis of uncontrolled criticism of the Personality Cult in Hungary. --</p> <p>"There now appears to have developed in Hungary a rash of criticism and a definite lack of control in certain places which has degenerated into violent attacks against the regime itself rather than against Stalinist practices."</p>
14.	27 April	25X1 <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 90px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	<p>Report on election of party cell secretariats reveals dissension within ranks of Hungarian Communist Party.</p>

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15.	27 April	25X1 	Report on arrest of Hungarian journalists because of their anti-regime activities.
16.	27 April		Specific examples of the confusion in the hierarchy and lower echelons of the Hungarian Communist Party.

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MAY

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20.	14 May	25X1	A 10-page report on the revolt of the Hungarian writers against Communist restrictions.
21.	27 May	Current Intelligence Bulletin, Page 7	"Unless willing to run counter to present Satellite policy by granting Rakosi increased police powers with which to subdue his party enemies, Moscow may be forced to reconsider its support of an increasingly unpopular and unstable figure."
22.	28 May	25X1	25X1 "On 12 March 1956 the first meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party (HWP) since the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party took place in an unsurpassed atmosphere of tension and violence." ... "The same stormy atmosphere prevailed in many party meetings in institutions and factories, with shouting and hysterical outbursts by disillusioned members who claimed to have been betrayed by the party's teachings over the past ten years."
23.	29 May	memo to DDI on the Leadership Problem in Hungary	25X1 ... "If the political situation continues to deteriorate, Moscow may be forced to withdraw its support of Rakosi to prevent the development of political chaos in Hungary." ... "The selection of one of Rakosi's supporters, or of an individual not belonging to either faction, would please those who have a strong personal dislike of Rakosi, but it might actually create more problems than it solves. There is little reason to believe that such a figure,

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23. (continued)			lacking Rakosi's experience and shrewdness, would be able to implement party policy better or to overcome the problem of party factionalism. In addition, the removal of Rakosi after so much overt criticism might generate additional pressures for an unrestrained, Nagy-like move to the right--which would be apparent not only in Hungary, but throughout the Satellites."

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE OF DISTRI- BUTION OR RELEASE</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION</u>
24.	6 June 25X1		Report on anti-Communist sentiments in Hungary.
25.	7 June		Report on the struggle for power in HWP. "The intensity of the struggle for power in the hierarchy of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party (HWP) continues to grow." ..."The disillusion of the rank and file with the Communist Party and its leadership is reflected in the minutes from activists' meetings held throughout the country...." 25X1
26.	15 June 25X1		a member of the Communist Party but actually he is quite anti-Communist.... He also stated that people in the area of Szent Istvan are not as afraid of the Communist regime as they used to be and said there are many evidences of anti-regime sentiment, including bulletins which were posted recently on walls in Szent Istvan which said in effect, "We would like to hang Rakosi." He reported that these bulletins were on the walls for several days as the police did not "see" them, a strong implication that the police shared the sentiment expressed." 25X1

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27.	16 June	TS Memo from DDP to DDI. NSC Planning Board draft of 7 June 1956, subject, "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe"	<p>1. Clandestine Services have the following general comments on this paper:</p> <p>a. We feel that the tone of the paper does not adequately reflect the degree of change which has emerged within the Satellites since the 20th CPSU Congress. As a result, this paper does not adequately reflect the real opportunities that the U.S. and other western powers may have to influence the direction of these changes and the resultant ferment. We feel that the draft [REDACTED] 25X1</p> <p>[REDACTED] 25X1</p> <p>[REDACTED] more adequately reflects the emerging opportunities. If similar plans were developed vis-a-vis the Satellites, including opportunities for manipulation via U.S. trade and fiscal policy, U.S. diplomatic moves and U.S. overt propaganda and information activities, particularly in the East-West contacts field, we believe that a rather impressive plan for potential action would emerge."</p>
28.	18 June	25X1 [REDACTED]	Continuation of attacks on Communist hierarchy.

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29.	21 June	RQM/OIS analysis of the Khrushchev attack on Stalin. <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div>	"Khrushchev's speech, however, has caused profound embarrassment to the Party leaders in the satellites. For these leaders served Stalin and are identified with his policies; and they cannot, like Khrushchev, absolve themselves by pleading helplessness before Stalin's tyranny, since this would constitute an acknowledgment that they have never in fact been independent of the Kremlin's dictates. To add to their difficulties, Khrushchev's violent indictment of the Communist regime which the satellite Parties had faithfully served has touched off a wave of cynicism among important intellectual and idealistic elements of those Parties. The result has been embarrassment, confusion and factionalism, the rehabilitation of leaders purged during the Stalin regime, demands upon the present leaders for self-criticism, and in some cases their replacement by new leaders.... The sudden revelation of specific details of the Stalin era has provided a shock which the satellite Parties have been unable to absorb without loss of discipline.... Hungarian Party members have been inspired to similar dissidence by the Soviet deglorification of Stalin. A central committee meeting shortly after the 20th Congress reportedly took place in an atmosphere of recrimination against first secretary Rakosi. High-level factionalism has continued. Rakosi's posthumous

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			rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk, former foreign minister purged and executed as a Titoist in 1949, has stimulated rather than quelled opposition elements. Nor has Rakosi's self-critical speech of 18 May appeased his opponents."
30.	22 June	25X1	"While Rakosi appears to have held his own so far, Marshal Tito's current visit to the USSR is expected to turn the decision against him.... The coming man in the Hungarian Workers' Party at the moment is Janos Kadar."
31.	22 June		Dissolution of party cell for advocating resignation of Rakosi.
32.	About 28 June	Briefing of Under-Secretary of State	At a meeting in the State Dept. on or about 28 June 1956 attended by the Director and the Deputy Director, Plans, there was extensive discussion of unrest in the Satellites. Both the Director and the DDP referred to the potential disturbances in Poland and Hungary.
33.	28 June	Current Intelligence Weekly	"Open Discontent: Dissidence, discontent and open demonstrations have appeared in one or another of the Satellites since the 20th Party Congress in the parties and in student and intellectual circles. This has not been of sufficient magnitude to represent a serious threat to the regimes. Such behavior, however, is symptomatic of the deep-seated and widespread hatred for Stalinist forms of


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			control that continues to seethe beneath the surface in Eastern Europe.... Moscow's dilemma, and the basic risk it is taking, is how to placate these feelings and if possible guide them gradually into productive channels without also causing their explosive and destructive release and perhaps forcing the USSR to intervene forcibly. It is at this point that Moscow appears to be most vulnerable in the long run as the corps of tried and tested Satellite leaders gradually dwindles and as, perhaps, less loyal leaders take over in each Satellite.

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35.	3 July	25X1	"The attempts of Mikhail Suslov, member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to mediate between opposing factions of the HWP (Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party) were abortive."
36.	3 July	25X1	"There has been a lack of direction by the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party (MDP) to its members serving at foreign posts as to how the MDP plans to react to the results of the 20th CPSU Party Congress." ..."The dismantling of frontier barriers between Hungary and Austria is described as a positive indication that the MDP feels confident it has the internal situation in Hungary under absolute control. The dismantling of these border obstacles will increase the number of flights of refugees from Hungary to Austria, but the loss of perhaps ten thousand inhabitants cannot seriously affect the stability of the present Hungarian government."
37.	6 July		25X1
38.	6 July	FBIS - USSR Survey	"The Satellites have hailed the CPSU Resolution as a contribution to working class unity and have completely avoided commenting on Togliatti's arguments in broadcasts to their domestic audiences. However, a unique comment by a Dr. Sandor Novobaczky broadcast by Budapest in Hungarian to Western Europe on 31 July stresses that the Togliatti article reflects the greater autonomy now being allowed all communist parties, including the Hungarian."

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38. (continued)			..."While there have been signs of increasing autonomy manifest in Satellite propaganda since the XX Congress, this commentary is the most blatant statement to date."
39.	6 July	FBIS - USSR Survey	"In the strongest indication of dissension within Hungarian Party ranks since the Rakosi-Nagy dispute, a 30 June Hungarian Central Committee resolution castigates 'anti-Party elements' for launching a steadily mounting attack and taking an 'open stand' against the Party. ..."The Central Committee resolution is followed by a SZABAD NEP editorial (3 July) claiming Petofi circles called for a 'new revolution' and a new 'ides of March.'"
40.	6 July	25X1 <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 80px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	1. Communist Overtures to Smallholders and Social Democrats. 2. Rehabilitation of Social Democrats.
41.	10 July	"Keystone" memo to Dept. of State forwarding draft of Satellite paper	The Satellite paper reads in part: "The denigration of Stalin has shaken the monolithic structure of Soviet power, has raised the basic questions as to the infallibility of Soviet leadership among important elements of communist parties in the satellite nations, and has resulted in arousing to varying degrees latent aspirations for relaxation of oppression, restoration of national independence, and establishment of governments responsive and responsible to popular will."

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41. (continued)			... "Even though the Kremlin is assumed to intend retaining real control over the satellite power structure, recent liberalizing policies have set in motion certain social and political trends toward independence, personal freedoms, and representative governments which may prove irreversible short of violent repression." ... "The developing ferment within the communist parties has been particularly noticeable among the youth and the intellectuals. It has manifested itself in many ways, including outright attacks on the Soviet Union. The thaw has gone furthest and the ferment has become most apparent in Poland, which has always resisted Soviet domination more than the other satellites. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Albania also have a growing degree of ferment."
42.	11 July	25X1	<div></div> Hungarian Discussion of Tito's Economic Proposal in Moscow "When Jozsef Revai, prominent member of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, was told of Tito's intention to raise this question in Moscow, he launched a determined attack at a recent secret party meeting against Matyas Rakosi, describing him as a despot interested only in furthering his own and his family's interests."
43.	19 July	FBIS - USSR Survey	"Apparently fearful of Satellite repercussions, Moscow has drastically underplayed the Polish disorders, particularly in broadcasts to the Satellites, who have heard no Soviet comment whatever except a single talk for Czechoslovakia audiences."

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43. (continued)			<p>..."Comment following the 30 June Hungarian Central Committee resolution condemning the views expressed at the Petofi Club meetings reflects the Central Committee decision to call a halt to the expression of excessively liberal views. Comment singles out the writers, Tardos and Deri for their erroneous views. However, the continuing criticism of the Petofi discussions is tempered by SZABAD NEP comment indicating a conciliatory policy toward the rank and file participants."</p> <p>..."There has been virtually no other Bloc comment on the Petofi discussions. However, a 15 July PRAVDA article cites the activities of the Petofi Club together with Poznan as stemming from activities of imperialist agents."</p> <p>..."Soviet concern over the weakening of Bloc and international Community unity and the possible spread of Titoism to the European Satellites has been particularly evident in Soviet propaganda since last month's restoration of free and equal Party ties with Yugoslavia and the abortive calls by Western Communist and Socialist leaders for greater autonomy from Moscow."</p>
44.	19 July	Current Intelligence Bulletin, Page 3	<p>"The removal of Matyas Rakosi from his post as Hungarian party first secretary and from his position on the politburo on 18 July, coupled with the election of new members to the politburo, represents a clear-cut gain for the moderate faction of the Party. The selection, however, of economic czar Erno Gero as the new first secretary probably reflects Moscow's desire to restrain and control the rightist movement, while simultaneously granting some of its demands. First Deputy Premier Gero is a "hard-line" Rakosi follower and reliable Moscow-oriented Communist."</p>

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44. (continued)			..."The removal of Rakosi and the increase in the power of the 'soft-line' forces are compromise measures which presumably have been adopted as a calculated risk, one that is to be minimized by the selection of Gero as party first secretary. The risk stems from the probable creation of confusion among Rakosi followers and the possible stimulation of new and outspoken demands from the intellectuals and from the party moderates, especially at lower levels."
45.	19 July	Notes for NSC Briefing by DCI	"Rakosi removal represents clear-cut gain for the moderate faction of the Hungarian party. In recent months, moderate forces have been coalescing into an active political force, favoring 'democratization' of the Communist system and immediate rise in living standards."  ..."Selection of such a doctrinal 'hard' as boss, coupled with simultaneous movement of several moderates to the politburo may create more problems than it solves. Hence, move appears to be a calculated risk in an effort to overcome factionalism."  ..."This risk stems both from creation of confusion among Rakosi's former followers and from stimulation of new and outspoken demands for concessions and change from intellectuals and party moderates, especially at lower levels, now that the bogey-man is gone."
46.	21 July	25X1 <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 60px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	Information on activities of Rakosi opponents obtained prior to his resignation.

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47.	23 July	25X1	<p>Present Attitudes of Hungarian Communists.</p> <p>"The rank-and-file membership of the MDP is reacting favorably to the 'different roads to socialism' theory. This theory appeals to the Hungarians since they would like to feel that they can solve their problems in a Hungarian way and not in the brutal way of the USSR. This theory of 'different roads to socialism' also makes room for a nationalistic solution and a feeling that different national mentalities require different types of treatment."</p>
48.	23 July		<p>"In the wake of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Imre Nagy's popularity has risen in Hungary. People ask each other what Nagy will do, if he joins the government in the immediate future, to effect a continued relaxation of controls and to improve the economic position of the man in the street. People feel that no major change can be expected from Matyas Rakosi or Erno Gero; therefore, their hopes are tied to Nagy."</p>
49.	25 July		<p>Specific examples of internal unrest.</p> <p>"At a writers' meeting on or about 10 July, 199 out of the two hundred persons who were present condemned the Central Committee's decision as 'undemocratic'."</p> <p>..."There have been strong indications of disaffection among Communist intellectuals. The intellectuals know, however, that they can wage a fight only inside the Party."</p> <p>..."Hungarians in general express criticism quite openly. They even dare to speak English to Westerners."</p>

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50.	26 July	25X1	<div></div> 25X1 "The events that started in Moscow with the de-Stalinization program have more than ever begun to have some influence in Hungary, and they are travelling at a pace where the results cannot be predicted."
51.	30 July		Possible Rehabilitation of Dissident Writers.
52.	30 July		"On 18 July 1956, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan addressed the Central Committee of the HWP (Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party), and admitted that the dismissal of former Premier Imre Nagy from the government had been a serious error."

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53.	2 August	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 80px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div> 25X1	Report on trial of Hungarian journalists for "public utterances of views against the state and the regime."
54.	2 August	NIE 11-4-56 Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961	"There are some risks for the USSR in this post-Stalin course, particularly in the possibility of exaggerated expectations in the Satellites. By permitting an atmosphere of expectant change to develop, Bloc leaders will probably stimulate new nationalist and reformist sentiment, even within the Satellite parties themselves, which could exceed the level that they anticipated or could safely allow. In the course of reversing Stalinist policies, particularly toward Yugoslavia, the USSR has weakened and in some cases destroyed the position of competent and dependable leaders. On the other hand, by seeking to maintain in power many of the leaders who were identified with Stalinist policies, the USSR risks disillusioning those who believed in its promises of greater independence and respect for national differences. Finally, the new policies will introduce a new element of complexity in Soviet-Satellite relations, with age-old controversies in Eastern Europe and differences in national tradition and temperament almost certainly increasing in importance." "Nevertheless, the basic instruments of Soviet domination--a core of Communist careerists whose first loyalty is to

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			Moscow, the functioning of Soviet advisers at key points in the Satellite armies and police systems, the substantial economic dependence of the Satellites on the USSR imposed by Soviet-directed economic plans, and the presence or proximity of Soviet armed force--will remain. Dissatisfaction among the Satellite populations will continue and, in the short run, may even increase and dramatize itself in sporadic protest movements. Over the longer run, if the regimes find it possible to combine somewhat less stringent economic policies with effective discipline, an increasingly resigned and accommodating attitude may emerge among the Satellite populations. However, if active opposition should increase, we believe that the regimes would employ whatever measures were necessary to maintain themselves in power, even at the cost of abandoning their current effort to conciliate the populations under their control."
55.	3 August	25X1	<div></div> <p>A monthly survey of developments in Hungary. "In conclusion, we tend to feel that Gero's emergence as party leader and his lukewarm policy formulations are interim measures, unlikely to satisfy anti-regime critics or restore party unity. The developments outlined above, when read together with Rakosi's forced resignation, point to the re-emergence of an effective body of public opinion in Hungary."</p>

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56.	3 August	25X1	More details on Petofi Circle Meetings.
57.	7 August		
58.	9 August	25X1 25X1	<p>"A true internal crisis exists within the Hungarian Workers' Party. The cause lies less in personal conflicts than in the fact that many prominent Communists have been dissatisfied by the mistakes made during the Stalin era. It is thus no wonder that criticism is led by intellectuals, such as writers, and artists."</p> <p>"In early August 1956 Budapest ward branches of the HWP (Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party) convened closed meetings of cell secretaries of plants and institutions to announce that the HWP Central Committee had decided to rehabilitate former Premier Imre Nagy, pending his self-criticism concerning certain errors committed during his tenure of office."</p>
59.	10 August		
60.	11 August	Current Intelligence Bulletin	<p>Commenting on (above)--</p> <p>"Previously Nagy has refused to engage in self-criticism, and the party as recently as mid-July reiterated that he was guilty of rightist deviation. However, the</p>

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61.	15 August	<div data-bbox="597 1199 794 1579"></div>	<p>increase in power of the moderate elements among Hungarian Communists and the removal of Nagy's primary opponent former party first secretary Rakosi, may have opened the way for Nagy to regain political influence by admitting some past errors and promising to work for party unity."</p> <div data-bbox="917 1207 1555 1329"></div> <p>reported continuous appearances of anti-Communist signs on walls and in factories around Szentistvan and an apparent lack of fear of Rakosi on the part of the people. [ ] also stated neighbors joined [ ] behind draw curtains to listen to VOA and RFE broad- casts."</p>
62.	16 August	<div data-bbox="597 1579 794 1579"></div>	<p>Comments on Hungarian Writers' Revolt. [ ] repeatedly emphasized that the writers' and artists' movement not only fought for intellectual freedom, but also for economic improvement. While it was true that today it was only a fight of "intellectuals," there could be no question that these intellectuals would never be satisfied with obtaining only greater freedom of speech and of the press. 'Results in literature are the forerunners of economic results,' he said."</p>

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63.	16 August	Current Intelli- gence Weekly Review	<p>[redacted] was quite excited about the result of the elections at the Writers' Association conference and ascribed to them an enormous political significance. The people, too, would have to acknowledge the writers' revolt, he said, and would have to understand that it was their affair, and that instead of passively resisting, they would have to support it actively. He vehemently denied, however, that he meant "activity" in the Poznan style, although he thought, in a general way, that the revolution could be carried outside the Party and become a national movement."</p> <p>"The immediate goal of the Satellite parties is to maintain or restore party unity; a longer-range purpose is to gain increased popular support for the Communist system. The approach to these objectives in Poland, and possibly Hungary, appears to represent a genuine departure from previous methods and thus holds at least some slim promise of gaining popularity for the system. Such a program, however, poses a direct threat to the immediate aim of building party unity, since increasing pressures for more political and economic freedom might produce a run-away movement that could be stopped only by direct Soviet intervention. Although, conversely, the more orthodox</p>	

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			<p>approach to the same objectives in the other Satellites may be attended by fewer risks, the likelihood of achieving the longer-range goal of popular support appears not much brighter than it did during the Stalin era." ...</p> <p>"The pressures for personnel and policy changes generated in Hungary by the Soviet party congress were second in magnitude only to those in Poland. Party factionalism and general disaffection with the top party leadership, evident since early last year, came more and more into the open and produced specific attacks against party leader Rakosi, condemnations of "Stalinist" policies, and strong calls for intellectuals and some party members for an era of party democracy and moderation." ...</p> <p>"It seems possible that Gero, with Moscow's support, may for a time achieve a measure of what Rakosi, with the same support, had utterly failed to accomplish, i.e., at least the surface appearance of party unity. By abandoning Rakosi's tendencies toward a hard line and by appearing conciliatory, while at the same time attempting to keep a restraining hand on the activities of the extreme right-wing group around former premier Imre Nagy, Gero may be able to reduce overt forms of party dissidence. But because he has been closely identified with Rakosi, Gero probably is basically unpalatable to major segments of the party."</p>

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25X1 64.	23 August		"Accordingly, his success is likely to be both limited and temporary and his position as first secretary may be shortlived. The eventual selection of a leader capable of gaining more support from within the party would appear to be a distinct possibility."
65.	23 August	Current Intelligence Weekly	"The regime of Erno Gero is merely transitory. All former adherents of Matyas Rakosi are to be ousted, since people will have absolutely no faith in the regime until that happens. The wing headed by Janos Kadar and Imre Nagy is expected to take the reins in the near future. This, along with the continuance of the new post-Stalin course, is hailed as the road to Hungary's slow but permanent rehabilitation. Imre Nagy himself will soon be rehabilitated and rejoin the party on the basis of a compromise formula, whereby the party will admit that Rakosi, in 1955, was guilty of injustice against Nagy, while Nagy will agree to revise his 'extremist' views."
			"During the five weeks since Gero's appointment as Hungarian party leader, the regime has granted an increasing number of significant concessions--economic, cultural and political--to elements of the party who favor an over-all "liberalization" program. This modification of policy, a

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			reflection of the strength of the moderate group, represents an effort to re-establish party unity through compromise and the abandonment of rigid doctrinal positions."
			"The most dramatic and potentially explosive aspect of this program has been the revision in the leadership's attitude concerning the future status of former premier Imre Nagy, who was ousted from the party by Rakosi last year on grounds of 'right-wing deviationism.'"
			"The politburo changes in July have taken on added significance in the light of the increasingly important public role of Janos Kadar, alleged leader of the moderate force, is playing in the implementation of party policy. On 12 August, Kadar, who was appointed to the party politburo and secretariat and now appears to be one of the top six figures in the party line by charging that the rightist deviation of Nagy in 1953 stemmed from errors committed between 1949 and 1953, presumably by Rakosi and Gero."
			"The moderates appear willing to work for party unity while consolidating and strengthening their political position and pressing for a step-by-step liberalization of the regime's policies. In this fashion, they hope to come to power without weakening the over-all authority of the party and without risking direct Soviet repressive action."

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66.	10 August	25X1	<p>"It appears likely that after consolidating their position, the moderates will carry their attack against Gero, whose resignation was demanded by the intellectuals even before the ouster of Rakosi. Andras Hegedus, present premier and a protege of Rakosi, probably is also a candidate for removal."</p> <p>Hungarian Artists' Comments on Problems of Communism.</p> <p>"The people felt that they had sufficient strength to achieve their final aim: complete freedom. For this, however, they needed the moral support of the Free World which was never as important as it was today. Since Stalin's dethronization, the position of the Hungarian Workers' Party had become more precarious than ever, the artists said.... It was the opinion of the members of the Hungarian artists' delegation that the increasing resistance among workers and intellectuals, the debates in the Petofi Circle, and the Hungarian reaction to the Czechoslovak and Polish unrest were all connected, and that something very important would spring from it."</p>
67.	28 August	25X1	<p>"The following views of</p> <p>Far reaching changes can be expected in Hungary soon,</p>

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			though less violent than those in Poland, according to [REDACTED] 25X1 thinks that in the May 1957 elections there will not be just the Communist-led 'Independent Front' but candidates nominated by other parties."

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SEPTEMBER

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68.	1 September	25X1	Unrest Preceding Rakosi's Resignation
69.	4 September		<p>"The Petofi Circle had undoubtedly been highly critical of the shortcomings of the Rakosi regime, [ ] admitted. Beginning as an organ of the Communist youth movement, it had attracted at first attendance of no more than some two hundred persons. Usually a member of the government was invited to lecture. In the course of time the meetings grew to be very popular, and on one occasion no less than 7,000 people attended; questions were freely raised, and the situation nearly developed into a riot. Many journalists complained that Petofi's main demand in 1848, 'Freedom for the Press,' had not been granted. The organizers were rebuked for allowing the meeting to get out of hand. But many intellectuals, mainly newspapermen and university students, remained critical and restive. [ ] appeared to approve of this movement."</p> <p>..."The future of Gero depended on the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, as did that of Andras Hegedus and other leaders. A change might occur in the foreseeable future 'as a result of the processes of the Communist democracy.' If Gero were to go, [ ] thought, Janos Kadar was a possible successor."</p>

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70.	6 September	25X1	"A meeting of HWP (Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party) members of the Writers' Association, held in early July 1956, developed into a lively discussion of the Central Committee resolution of 30 June 1956. The terms of the resolution were, in effect, rejected by a majority of those in attendance, who proclaimed the right to independent expression in the spirit of the decisions made by the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party."
71.	10 September	25X1	Hungarian Reaction to Matyas Rakosi's Resignation. ..."The comments by the Central Committee on the Nagy problem were sharp in tone and tended to convince most of the MDP members in East Berlin that Nagy is the man of the future in Hungarian politics. It is felt that, if the present trend continues, Nagy and his followers will soon remove Gero and the eventual control of the MDP and the Hungarian government will be in the hands of the Nagy faction."
72.	20 September	25X1	Report on Economic Deterioration in Hungary. as his opinion that Erno Gero, the new First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, would not remain in power for more than another six months in the face of the worsening economic situation, as he did not have the ability to master it."

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73.	25 September	Current Intelligence Bulletin, Page 3	"Soviet Influence Seen Seriously Threatened in Hungary" ..."The USSR apparently has already warned Hungary and the other Satellites not to trans- gress the Soviet-established limits of the 'independent roads to Socialism' doctrine, but this warning has evidently had little effect in Hungary to date."
74.	27 September	FBIS - USSR Survey	"Reacting to the reportedly defiant stand taken by the Hungarian writers in rejecting criticisms by Party functionaries at the 17 September meeting of the Writers' Federation, a SZABAD NEP editorial on 19 September couches its rejoinder in a moderate tone."
75.	September 1956	Extract from rough notes of DDI for speech to Army War College	"II Satellites -- Ferment - Greatest since 45-48 Real loosening of reins - gave up trying to dictate details want sympathetic 'allied' regimes e.g., Commy but not automatons or puppets. Almost a 'Commonwealth' a la British Two phases--straighten out party disputes; then get increasing popular support--inter- connection. <u>Poles leading</u> Moderates under Cyrankiewicz quite extra- ordinary advances and measures after Poznan riots Real elections - really told Bulganin off Cozying up to French and US stressing inde- pendence of foreign policy - <u>Hungary next</u> - Rakosi- tough Moscow oriented boy ousted - Gero - Middle of roader apparently paving way for Nagy--virtually a Titoist."

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OCTOBER

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76.	3 October	Extracts from notes prepared for DDCI use at NSC briefing	<p>"These talks <u>[Tito-Khrushchev]</u> evidently stem from a recent agreement among the Soviet leaders that some form of action must be taken to reassert Soviet control in the two Satellites that have shown the sharpest trend toward 'over-democratization' and 'independence' --Poland and Hungary."</p> <p>..."Hungarian party boss Gero--who arrived <u>[at Yalta]</u> at the same time as Bulganin--was probably brought in to reinforce the argument that Polish and Hungarian trends contain the seeds of a Western bourgeois heresy much like the Djilas heresy Tito has suppressed in Yugoslavia.</p>
77.	3 October	Watch Report of the Intelligence Advisory Committee	<p>"The Tito-Khrushchev talks in Belgrade and those in the Crimea which have also involved the head of the Hungarian Communist Party and various Soviet Party and military leaders: The primary reason for these talks appears to be Soviet concern over the effects on Satellite Communist Parties of Tito's independent policies and relations with the USSR. This concern was evident in a Soviet warning of 3 September to the Satellites to follow the USSR rather than Yugoslavia in their evolution toward socialism. It cannot be determined whether Soviet-Yugoslav differences are as serious as the Yugoslavs have indicated. The unexplained presence of Marshal Grechko, Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, despite the apparent absence of his military superiors and of Yugoslav military advisers, may indicate some military interest in these talks bearing on the Soviet military position in Eastern Europe."</p>

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78.	4 October	Current Intelligence Weekly, Page 2 of 5	"The USSR is faced with a dilemma of major proportions by these developments in the Satellites. The decision to adopt a tougher attitude toward at least Poland and Hungary will, if it is to be successfully implemented, threaten the efficacy of the USSR's general foreign policy line of relaxation and peaceful coexistence. Failure to act decisively, on the other hand, might inevitably lead to a not-too-distant choice between military intervention or a loss of control over some of the Satellites."
79.	6 October	Current Intelligence Bulletin, Page 4	"Communist and anti-Russian demonstrations may occur in Hungary and Poland during the next few days. "The Hungarian party, apparently in symbolic rejection of Soviet domination, has announced a ceremonial funeral procession in Budapest on 6 October bearing the remains of Laszlo Rajk, the former Titoist and 'national deviationist' now hailed as an 'outstanding leader of Hungarian labor,' and three Communists executed with Rajk."
80.	8 October	25X1	Trade Unions' Criticism of Working Conditions
81.	10 October		"It is believed that the formation of a more liberal Hungarian Government, possibly including Nagy, but certainly reflecting a broader political base, may be announced on 22 October. The critical economic situation in Hungary, especially the shortage in investment funds and fuel, will probably be given as a reason for the inception of more liberal economic policies which will include a cutback in five-year plan goals and more stress on consumer needs."

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82.	11 October	FBIS - USSR Survey	"Recent statements by leading Hungarian writers reaffirm the defiant stand taken against Party critics at the 17 September Writers' Federation meeting."
83.	11 October	Extract from notes for OCI briefing for Joint Staff at Pentagon	"The Hungarians have, as have the Poles, looked increasingly toward Yugoslav and--in some cases, Western--concepts for use in the ideological vacuum created by the de-Stalinization program. Although not as yet restored to the Party, both Nagy and his policies have grown in prestige and influence. "When the Soviet leaders saw that its directives were being, at the very least, ignored in Poland and Hungary--in contrast to the faithful actions of the Parties in the other Satellites--it became perfectly obvious that something would have to be done about their Satellite policies. ..."There is no evidence whatsoever to date that the two most courageous Satellites, Poland and Hungary, are slowing down either their push for internal liberalization or their attempts to develop closer ties with Yugoslavia. ..."The reactions in the Satellites, particularly Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to the de-Stalinization pronouncements at the 20th Soviet Party Congress were--for Communist countries--no less than violent. Party leaders in these countries apparently were almost completely unprepared for a series of remarkable and open displays of discontent."

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84.	15 October	<div>25X1</div>	<div>25X1</div> <p>have developed to the point where they are prepared to preach anti-Communism on the street corners if necessary. However, they are biding their time for a more propitious moment."</p>
85.	16 October		<p>"Bela Kovacs, former leader of the old Smallholders' Party who spent many years as a Soviet prisoner in Siberia, is reported to have sought contact with Hungarian emigres of centrist orientation in order to obtain guidance. Kovacs has been asked by the Imre Nagy faction in Hungary to participate again in the country's political life. He is believed to have consented.</p> <p>..."At the same time, there have been persistent rumors in Hungarian political circles that Hungary may be the first Satellite country to permit other than single-list elections, and that a Social-Democrat ticket as well as a Smallholders' ticket may be offered at an election in the near future."</p>
86.	18 October	FBIS - USSR Survey	<p>"Since Rakosi's ouster Budapest comment has reflected an interest, equalled only by Polish propaganda, in Yugoslavia's potential contribution to Hungarian development through exchanges of experience. Such exchanges have been a consistent element in Yugoslavia's definition of the 'new relations' needed between fraternal Communist parties."</p>

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86. (continued)			<p>..."Hungary has been the most widely discussed of the Satellites in Belgrade propaganda, and its de-Stalinization moves have been in line with what Yugoslavia urged. Belgrade has called for the rehabilitation of Nagy and restoration of his policies; Nagy was readmitted to the Party on the eve of the 15 October Tito-Gero talks in the Yugoslav capital, and Budapest propaganda hints at some measure of restoration of his program.</p> <p>..."Soviet apprehensiveness over the impact of the restoration of socialist respectability to Yugoslavia may have had on the Satellites--as claimed by BORBA to be reflected in a secret CPSU letter to Satellite Parties--has been manifested indirectly in the behavior of Soviet propaganda."</p>
87.	22 October	OCT memo to DDI	<p>"The result of such a policy would in the long run represent a radical departure from previous patterns of Soviet control and a significant change in Soviet concepts of empire. In addition, under such a revised concept, the risk would grow that some or all of the Satellites might overthrow their Communist regimes, and/or might abandon all ties with the USSR. Thus, the Soviet Union might then be confronted with having to decide between a complete loss of its influence in the Satellites or military intervention in the area to retain that influence."</p>
88.	22 October	25X1	<div data-bbox="631 1789 815 1850" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 113px; height: 29px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <p>Report on possible reactivation of opposition parties.</p>

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89.	23 October	25X1		25X1
			<p>'I am an old man who has had extensive experience with the USSR, and I have been able to interpret developments and trends in the workers' struggle for the past fifteen years. The recent situation, however, has me confused. I am unable to offer any statements of guidance as to where the present course is leading.</p> <p>'I have had no policy guidance from Budapest on the recent situation in Hungary and Poland.</p> <p>'The apparent results of the conversations between Erno Gero and Marshal Tito in Belgrade indicate that Hungary will use Yugoslavia as a model upon which to build the Hungarian national way to Socialism.'</p>	
90.	9 November	<p>Extract from Status Report on Hungary given by the Director at the White House to a bi-par-tisan Congressional Group</p>	<p>"This situation we recognized as explosive. Our evaluation of the situation dated 21 August 1956 said:</p> <p>'Even though the Kremlin is assumed to intend retaining real control over the Satellites, recent more flexible policies have set in motion certain social and political trends toward independence, personal freedom, and representative govern-ments which may become irreversible, short of forcible repression.'"</p>	
91.	18 November	<p>Article by Robert S. Allen in <u>New York Post</u></p>	<p>"Dulles also asserted the CIA had submitted numerous reports on unrest in the satellites and the likelihood of uprisings.</p>	

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91. (continued)			"'It is difficult to forecast the exact timing of such revolts,' he pointed out. 'You can never tell just what will touch them off. But we definitely knew they were in the making, and also that the Kremlin would react as ruthlessly as it did in Hungary, and may yet do in Poland.'"

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## THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION

67

RESOLUTION 1133(XI), as submitted by 37 powers, A/3658 and Add.1, adopted by Assembly on 14 September 1957, meeting 677, by roll-call vote of 60 to 10, with 10 abstentions, as follows:

*In favour:* Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.

*Against:* Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Yugoslavia.

*Abstaining:* Afghanistan, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen.

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Recalling its resolution 1132(XI) of 10 January 1957, establishing a Special Committee, consisting of representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, to investigate, and to establish and maintain direct observation in Hungary and elsewhere, taking testimony, collecting evidence and receiving information, as appropriate,*

*"Having now received the unanimous report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary,*

*"Regretting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary have failed to co-operate in any way with the Committee,*

*"1. Expresses its appreciation to the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary for its work;*

*"2. Endorses the report of the Committee;*

*"3. Notes the conclusion of the Committee that the events which took place in Hungary in October and November of 1956 constituted a spontaneous national uprising;*

*"4. Finds that the conclusions reached by the Committee on the basis of its examination of all available evidence confirm that:*

*"(a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights;*

*"(b) The present Hungarian régime has been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;*

*"(c) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has carried out mass deportations of Hungarian citizens to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;*

*"(d) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has violated its obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949;*

*"(e) The present authorities in Hungary have violated the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace with Hungary;*

*"5. Condemns these acts and the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly;*

*"6. Reiterates its concern with the continuing plight of the Hungarian people;*

*"7. Considers that further efforts must be made to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in regard to Hungary in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly;*

*"8. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present authorities in Hungary, in view of evidence contained in the report, to desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian people, to respect the liberty and political independence of Hungary and the Hungarian people's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and to ensure the return to Hungary of those Hungarian citizens who have been deported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;*

*"9. Requests the President of the eleventh session of the General Assembly, H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithayakon, as the General Assembly's special representative on the Hungarian problem, to take such steps as he deems appropriate, in view of the findings of the Committee, to achieve the objectives of the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1004(ES-II) of 4 November 1956, 1005(ES-II) of 9 November 1956, 1127(XI) of 21 November 1956, 1131(XI) of 12 December 1956 and 1132(XI) of 10 January 1957, to consult as appropriate with the Committee during the course of his endeavours, and to report and make recommendations as he may deem advisable to the General Assembly;*

*"10. Decides to place the Hungarian item on the provisional agenda of the twelfth session of the General Assembly."*

GENERAL ASSEMBLY—12TH SESSION  
Plenary Meetings 678, 684, 726, 731.  
General Committee, meeting 112.

A/3773. Report of Credentials Committee.

A/3774. Report of General Assembly's Special Representative on Hungarian Problem.

RESOLUTION 1183(XII), as recommended by Credentials Committee, A/3773, adopted by Assembly on 10 December 1957, meeting 726, by 77 votes to 1.

*"The General Assembly*

*"Approves the report of the Credentials Committee."*

## OTHER DOCUMENTS

A/AC.88/1. Letter of 20 December 1957 from Special Committee on Problem of Hungary to Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungarian People's Republic.

A/3571. Note by Secretary-General transmitting text of resolution and conclusions adopted by Governing Body of ILO.

A/3578 and Corr.1. Note by Secretary-General transmitting at request of Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs text of communication of 16 April